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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to automated negotiation between agents which
attempts to combine the advantages of a co-operative value adding approach, with
the reality that negotiating agents are also competing. We use the concept of a
trusted mediator to facilitate openness regarding what one values, without disad-
vantaging oneself by revealing sensitive information (such as a reserve price) to
the other party. Social science and management literature deals with negotiation
between people, and so can be both more complex, and less well defined than au-
tomated negotiation between software agents. We take inspiration from the social
science literature and develop a computational framework to support negotiating
software agents. The framework includes recognition that agents are self inter-
ested, and therefore will manipulate the system to their advantage if possible. We
include mechanisms to discourage this kind of manipulation in the form of a trans-
action cost associated with making only small concessions, and a bias in dividing
the pie which is the gain from trade which favours the agent who is most “honest”
in making offers.
Keywords: automated negotiation, integrative and distributive bargaining,
BATNA, multi-criteria decision making
1 Introduction
Many decisions in our everyday life are increasingly being made by computers in a rel-
atively autonomous fashion. For instance, the routing of telephone calls and data pack-
ets in telecommunication networks has been controlled and decided autonomously by
computers. Computers make decisions and control over how loads in electrical grids
will be balanced at times of peak demand. Similarly research is being done on how
computers can react to, and control, automative and airplane traffic in real time. In
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many cases, these decisions are generated as concerted efforts between several ma-
chines. Moreover, the involved machines might represent different entities or organi-
sations, possibly with conflicting interests. Thus, there is a real need for these systems
to negotiate with each other to come to agreements.
Nonetheless, negotiation is a complex task that needs to manage a balance between
competition and collaboration. Most research in automated negotiation to date has
focussed on the competitive aspects. However work by Dispute Resolution theorists
in the social sciences has also focussed substantially on how to achieve negotiated
agreements that are of a high value to all parties (e.g., see [6, 19, 37]). Integrative,
or interest-based, negotiation has been widely recognised as the more successful ap-
proach to the negotiation problem. In this work we consider how some of the aspects
of this approach can be represented in a computational framework, to allow its use in
automated negotiation.
One of the difficulties with this is that, although the constructive and positive ap-
proach of integrative negotiation to creating value for all participants is extremely use-
ful, negotiation still does have a competitive element, and negotiators can generally
be assumed to be self-interested. In particular, Lax and Sebenius [19] argue that most
negotiation actually involves both integrative and distributive bargaining.1 Moreover,
these two aspects of a negotiation are most of the time intertwined (see the Negotiator’s
Dilemma discussed later ion this paper), resulting in a challenging decision-making
problem for the negotiators. Consequently, we must ensure in our computational sys-
tem that our approach be constructive and creating value, not lead to opportunities
for manipulation for self-interest, or at least that such opportunities be recognised and
controlled.
Our approach, at a high level, is to introduce a trusted third party, the mediator,
who is guaranteed not to profit in any way from the outcome of the negotiation. The
presence of this mediator does not remove all opportunities for manipulation, but does
allow us to provide greater control, and also allows parties to reveal information to the
mediator whilst keeping it from the other party. For example, to honestly disclose one’s
reserve price (or for the buyer, top price to pay) to the other party would not be viable,
as they would almost certainly use this information to their advantage. However, to
disclose this information to a trusted mediator is a lot more viable. From a technical
point of view, our framework is based on multi-criteria decision making theory.
The use of a mediator in our framework helps facilitate more efficient outcomes
in automated negotiations which have become increasingly popular in electronic com-
merce [8, 23]. Our framework also forms a basis for Negotiation Support Systems
(NSS) that provide support to human decision-makers who engage in real-life negotia-
tions such as out-of-court settlements (see, for instance, [3, 7, 21, 22, 31]).
The overall aim of our approach is to increase the likelihood of finding an agree-
ment if the possibility exists, to favour agreements that are of high value to both par-
ticipants, and to favour agreements that are ”fair”, in the sense that advantage is shared
between the parties in some controlled manner. In the rest of this paper we explore
1Informally, distributive bargaining is a competitive negotiation strategy that is used to decide how to
distribute a fixed resource, such as money. Essentially, it contrasts with integrative bargaining in which the
parties are trying to make more of something.
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these ideas in more detail. We first provide some background on the two main ap-
proaches to negotiation: the integrative and the distributive approaches. In Section
4 we outline our computational framework that combines integrative and distributive
negotiation with the assistance of a mediator. We then explore some details of the
mediated negotiation process, focussing on mechanisms to avoid manipulation by ei-
ther agent. Finally, we discuss the advantages that we consider this approach provides,
compared to other work, and outline work in progress to evaluate whether in fact the
approach does lead on average to higher-value, fairer transactions, even when agents
are attempting to manipulate the situation for their own benefit.
2 Background
2.1 The “Getting to Yes” (GTY) approach
An approach that has had tremendous influence on negotiation theory in the social
sciences, is the approach by Fisher and Ury [6], which focusses both on an integrative
approach to the overall negotiation process, and also on the evaluation process of the
individuals involved. In this work we focus primarily on the former aspect, though
we also note that if agents adopted an evaluation strategy based on the principle of
comparison with the “Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement”, this would likely
also assist in better outcomes of negotiation processes.
Much of Fisher and Ury’s work concerns discussion of the people behind the nego-
tiation, how to take account of individuals, and how to effectively use what amounts to
interpersonal skills. However there are a number of aspects of their model which can
effectively be incorporated into a computational model, although such a computational
model, which can be realised in software, of necessity lacks some of the creativity and
nuances of human-based negotiation.
Some key aspects of Fisher and Ury’s [6] approach are as follows:
1. Focus on interests, not on positions:
They stress the importance of recognising interests, both one’s own and the other
party’s, rather than getting stuck in conflicting positions. They make the point
that not all interests are necessarily conflicting. It is important to be clear and
specific about one’s interests, while remaining flexible about possible positions.
2. Look at options for mutual gain:
There are usually some aspects of a negotaition that are not in conflict, where
there are win-win options. It is important to identify these and make them part
of the agreement. They acknowledge though that this can be complex, in that
disclosing options for mutual gain can also provide information that jeopardises
the bargaining position regarding aspects that are in conflict.
3. Use objective criteria where possible:
Most negotiations take place in a space where there are some standards or objec-
tive information available. It is appropriate to use this as part of a negotiation,
although it may not always be clear exactly which objective information to use.
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They give an example of an insurance company negotiating with a claimant about
the value of a car. Although there are various possibilities with regard to the ob-
jective information - blue book value, new price, replacement value, etc. - the
negotiation does not take place in an information vacuum.
4. Individuals need a comparison point:
They discuss the value of a clear “bottom line” in ensuring that an individual,
in the heat of a negotiation, does not make an agreement that is not really in
his/her best interest. They point out that although this can be important to avoid
bad agreements, it is inevitably too rigid as it does not allow for flexibility in
considering options that arise. They propose the concept of “Best Alternative To
Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA) as an important concept for the negotiating
parties. In order to evaluate a proposal, they argue that a party needs clarity on
what their best option is if no agreement is reached - i.e. if the negotiation fails.
All proposals should be considered in relation to the individual’s BATNA. It does
not make sense to allow a negotiation to fail if the proposal offered is better than
the BATNA. Clarity regarding one’s BATNA - as well as consideration of the
other’s BATNA - is very important in the negotiation process. They also make
the point that if one’s BATNA is strong, then advantage is gained by disclosing
it, whereas if it is weak one is disadvantaged by disclosure. They also make the
point that if both parties have a strong BATNA, it is possible that it is better not
to reach a negotiated agreement.
Some of the concepts of Fisher and Ury’s approach have been incorporated into
the integrative approach to negotiation, specifically with respect to trying to identify
interests and to look for possibilities of mutual gain. Furthermore, research also shows
that negotiators with attractive BATNAs feel less dependent on their opponent and
achieve higher personal outcomes than negotiators with no (or less attractive) BATNAs
[25, 26]. In addition, high BATNAs stimulate parties to search for integrative agree-
ments that combine all parties’ aspirations, simply because parties are unwilling to
settle for less than their alternative [35]. Thus, BATNA appears to be a good measure
to be used in predicting negotiation outcomes as well as in negotiation analysis.
2.2 Distributive and Integrative Negotiation
By viewing the negotiation problem as a decision-making problem, most approaches
are categorised either as descriptive (or behavioural) studies or normative studies. For
instance, Walton and McKersie’s [37] analysis of qualitative differences between inte-
grative and distributive negotiation types provided a basis for further descriptive studies
of negotiation processes. They eventually led to the formulation of a number of pre-
scriptions regarding strategies and tactics in distributive and integrative negotiations,
their informational requirements, and even possible solutions. On the other hand, game
theory, as opposed to descriptive studies, provides formal and normative approaches to
model bargaining. Within this camp, bargaining theories are further divided up into
two areas. Strategic bargaining games provide a formal description of the bargain-
ing procedure and its influence on the equilibrium outcomes. This approach, however,
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is based on the assumption that players behave non-cooperatively. As has been dis-
cussed throughout the present paper, this is not always plausible and usually leads to
non-optimal negotiation outcomes. Cooperative bargaining theory, on the other hand,
characterises the desirable properties of bargaining solutions by a set of axioms. How-
ever, the process leading to the outcome is not described in the solution.
Approaches developed from Fisher and Ury’s seminal work are generally espoused
as positive, and leading to win-win situations, rather than win-lose situations which are
described as resulting from the more traditional distributive approach. Basically, dis-
tributive negotiation predicts that one party can only gain at the other party’s expense.
The parties are competitive and they claim value. In contrast, integrative negotiation is
based on the premise that solutions can be found, during and because of the process,
which reconcile the parties’ interests. The key characteristics that distinguish integra-
tive negotiations from distributive ones are: creation of value; focus on interests and
not positions; openness and exchange of relevant information, and even learning; and
problem restructuring. Within the literature in social sciences, by both conflict theo-
rists and management scientists, a number of monographs have been dedicated to the
integrative negotiation approach (e.g., see [5, 6, 28]).
Within the literature of automated negotiation, Guttman and Maes [8] explore the
approaches to automated electronic trading and claim that the distributive approach
typically used has several destructive features, such as (a) hiding important merchant
value-added services from consumer consideration, and (b) setting up the involved
parties as opposing players in a win-lose game. They discuss a number of techniques
such as multi-attribute utility theory, distributed constraint satisfaction, and conjoint
analysis, which can help lead to a more integrative approach.
Our position is that while integrative negotiation is very important in reaching good
agreements, in fact distributive and integrative negotiation are both necessary parts.
This is a view supported by conflict theorists such as Lax and Sebenius [19], who refer
to the integrative aspect as ”creating value” and the distributive aspect as ”claiming
value”. Negotiators face a dilemma in deciding whether to pursue a cooperative or a
competitive strategy at a particular time during a negotiation. They refer to this problem
as the Negotiator’s Dilemma.
Most of the work on automated negotiation tends to be clearly distributive in na-
ture, looking at strategies and infrastructures that have nice game theoretic properties
in terms of good behaviour by participating agents. This can be easily seen through the
most prevalent works within the literature of automated negotiation, ranging from early
and influential work on automated negotiation by Rosenschein and Zlotkin [30, 39], to
Kraus’ [15] survey paper on negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments,
on to the more recent line of research in automated negotiation led by Wooldridge and
Jennings [4, 11] and Sandholm [18, 32]. Rosenschein and Zlotkin’s work explores sev-
eral problem domains for automated negotiation, namely the task-oriented domain, the
state-oriented domain, and the worth-oriented domain. Several negotiation strategies
were also introduced, based on the assumptions that agents are self-interested and look
to maximise their own uitilities and do not attempt to cooperate to search for joint im-
provements. Kraus also looks only into strategic models of negotiation, in particular
to solve the problems of resource sharing, task distribution, and coalition formation.
Wooldridge, Jennings, and Sandholm, and their respective groups formulate the auto-
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mated negotiation problem based on the bargaining game as defined by game theorists.
This setting is purely distributive negotiation. This trend towards distributive negotia-
tion in the literature of automated negotiation is perhaps most visible in the following
statement in Wooldridge’s [38] review of Kraus’s [16] monograph “Strategic Negotia-
tion in Multiagent Environments”:
[What] marks out negotiation as studied in multi-agent systems is the idea
that the processes (agents) involved are self-interested: they are attempting
to get the best deal for themselves that they can, and what is best for one
is not necessarily best for the other.
Kersten [14] has explored approaches in terms of both integrative and distributive
methods and has analysed differences between them. He does suggest some modifica-
tions to formal negotiation models to make them more flexible and useful. However to
our knowledge there is no work in automated agent based negotiation which attempts
to integrate the distributive and integrative approaches in a principled manner. It is this
that we attempt to do.
The Negotiator’s Dilemma, of conflict between sharing information in order to
achieve good cooperative solutions, and hiding information in order to maximise one’s
competitive edge, is addressed, at least partially, by a mediator who allows both infor-
mation disclosure, and information hiding. The use of a mediator is explored by Lin
and Chou [20] who propose an approach based on Fisher’s Single Negotiation Text
(SNT) device. The mediator introduces a proposed settlement and then the negotiating
parties criticise it. The mediator then comes up with a new proposal that addresses (at
least some of) the criticisms. However the Better Half (BH) strategy developed by them
appears to be over-simplistic, and it is difficult to see how a mediator could work out
new proposals without an integrative negotiation phase paving the way for the process
of distributive negotiation.
2.3 Basic definitions
In this section, we define the concepts and their formulations which are derived from
seminal works in negotiation analysis and multiple-criteria decision making [13, 27,
34].
1. Negotiator (aka. agent) is a party who is involved in a negotiation of discussion.
Negotiators are denoted by i, (i = 1, . . . , n).
2. Attribute (aka. issue, dimension, criterion) is the topic of discussion in a negoti-
ation, such as price, length of warranty, delivery time, etc. Attributes are denoted
by j, (j = 1, . . . ,m).
3. Attribute value (aka. option) is one of the alternative values that an attribute can
take, such as $2500 or ‘3-year-warranty’. Values of attribute j can be denoted by
xj .
4. Outcome (aka. decision alternative) is a specific combination of values selected
for one or more attributes (e.g., [price = $2500;warranty = ‘3-year-warranty’]).
Outcomes are denoted by o = [xj ] ∈ O.
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5. Interest (aka. objective) is an attribute, or combination of attributes, that is of
particular interest to the negotiator i and allows to evaluate offers.
6. Preference indicates the importance of an interest in comparison with another
interest.
7. Trade-off is an exchange process in which a negotiator gives up partly on the
achievement of one issue so as to gain on another.
8. Utility is a measure based on the negotiator’s value function and some negotiation-
specific regulations, such as participation fees, transaction costs, etc.
9. Gains from trade are the positive value attainable from the negotiated aggre-
ment.2 For instance, in a bargaining between a seller and a buyer over the price
of an item, if the buyer values the item at $100 whilst the seller would accept as
little as $70 for the item, then the gains from trade (also known as the pie, or the
cake in the negotiation literature) in this negotiation is $30.
3 Potential Advantages and Issues: An Example
We introduce here a small example in order to illustrate aspects of integrative and
distributive negotiation, and their benefits and limitations. We will continue to use this
example as we describe our approach to negotiation.
The example we will take is one of a buyer and a seller negotiating over the pur-
chase of a laptop. Using integrative negotiation to explore attributes of value to the
various parties, we may be able to discover that in addition to the obvious attribute of
price, there is a warranty attribute, where a long warranty is valued by the buyer, and is
of little cost to the seller. Reciprocally, the payment type “cash” is perhaps valued by
the seller, and is of no cost to the buyer. Consequently, with any given price agreement,
a more efficient, or higher value, agreement can be reached by including a long war-
ranty, and cash payment in the terms of sale. These added value options can possibly
be found only by an exploratory phase to establish potential possible win-win aspects
of the deal.
However, even if there are substantial win-win aspects that can be discovered and
incorporated into an agreement, in most cases there is still some core aspect where
the parties have conflicting interests. These aspects then still require some standard,
or distributive negotiation, where some balancing between the competing interests is
achieved. In our example (and virtually all trading examples), price is an attribute
where it is virtually guaranteed that the buyer and seller will have conflicting interests:
2The concept of gains from trade is of course borrowed from game theory. In game theory, gains from
trade appear in at least two ways. First, if a game has a positive value, then there are potential gains for
the players. Second, in positive sum games, players may be able to coordinate their behaviour to produce
gains for all. Both ways fit well into the discussions in this paper with the former corresponding to the fixed
resource (i.e., the pie) to be shared between the negotiators during distributive negotiation. On the other
hand, the latter corresponds to the negotiating parties trying to enlarge the pie by creating more value, i.e.,
integrative negotiation.
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all else being equal, the buyer wants a low selling price, while the seller wants a high
one.
There may occasionally be integrative solutions where there is in fact no conflict.
For example consider two children negotiating over who will get a single orange. On
exploration of what is valued, it turns out that one child wants to eat the orange, while
the other wants the peel for baking a cake. A win-win solution is of course to share
the orange in such a way that each child’s desires are fully met, as once the options
are fully understood, there is no conflict. However most negotiation situations do have
some element of conflicting desires.
If in our laptop sale example a distributive approach is taken from the start (even
using multiple attributes), it is quite likely that a deal would be reached that did not
necessarily contain the optimal values regarding payment type and warranty length. In
some cases, if potential overlap is small, discovering and exploiting the non-conflicting
attributes can make the difference between reaching an agreement or not. If for exam-
ple the lowest viable price of the seller (assuming payment by credit card) is $2500,
and the highest possible price for the buyer is $2400, then there would appear to be no
possible agreement. However, if the use of credit card costs the seller 5%, then recog-
nition of the fact that the buyer is willing to pay cash (and therefore save the seller
$125) opens up the possibility of a deal.
Clearly integrative negotiation is valuable - but not enough in itself. However,
naively combining integrative and distributive approaches also leads to problems. A
buyer would prefer to keep the information that he is willing to pay cash, to obtain a
final advantage once other negotiating strategies have been fully exploited. Disclosing
this from the start potentially weakens his position. Maximising the use of the integra-
tive approach requires openness and honesty. However the bargaining that is central
to distributive negotiation relies on not disclosing all information. Thus there is an
inherent conflict between the two approaches.
4 An Overview of the Proposed Approach
The approach that we propose recognises the view of conflict theorists that successful
negotiation involves both creating value and claiming value. We propose two clearly
separated phases – an integrative phase that explores and expands the value space, and
a distributive phase that then determines the distribution details of that part of the value
space where the parties have conflicting interests.
In order to address the conflict between sharing information and hiding informa-
tion, we introduce a mediator with whom information is shared, thus addressing at
least to some extent the issue of disclosure of information disadvantaging the disclos-
ing party. However, it is still possible for the negotiating parties to be dishonest and/or
manipulative in the information that they disclose, in order to gain a potential advan-
tage. However, as we discuss below, such a strategy would risk derailing the negotia-
tion to the detriment of all, including the “dishonest” agent. The mediator also controls
the way the final pie of agreement is distributed: this is done in a manner that rewards
“fairness”.
We aim, then, to define a model that results in:
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• Efficient negotiations: if an agreement is possible, it will in fact be reached.
• Outcomes that are intuitively “fair”: gains from trade are distributed amongst the
participants in an equitable manner.
In particular, the model is designed to penalize agents that attempt to manipulate the
negotiation process to their unfair advantage.
Our model departs from previous approaches in three main ways:
1. We introduce a mediator into the negotiation process. The mediator is a trusted
third-party agent that has no interest in the specific outcomes of the negotia-
tion, in that it does not benefit according to the utility of either agent. A much-
discussed example of the use of a meditator in a real world negotiation was the
Camp David negotiation in September 1978 in which the negotiation between
Egypt and Israel was mediated by the United States (see [27] for a detailed dis-
cussion).3 negotiation process. As described earlier, these two phases are often
intertwined. One of the roles of the mediator is to manage each of these processes
separately.
2. We use the mediator to reward “honest” negotiation behaviour (based on dis-
crepancy between the agent’s reported reserve value and the offers she makes
to reach an agreement) by biasing the final distribution of the pie on a deal be-
ing reached. We also apply a penalty based on the number of concessions made
by an agent, in order to provide a disincentive from making small incremental
concessions to their offers.
4.1 The Mediator
The Negotiation Mediator, or simply mediator, is an independent third-party agent that
mediates information exchange and acts as a “referee” in the negotiation process. A
critical property of the mediator is that it hold no interest from the specific outcome of
the negotiation that it mediates; it may be compensated for conducting the mediation
process, but the reward must not be based on any particular outcome.
The mediator is designed to both increase efficiency and help ensure fairness of the
negotiation. It does so by the following means:
1. Acting as a decision-maker for integrative bargaining. Agents communicate their
attributes of interest to the mediator, rather than to each other. The mediator cal-
culates the intersection of attributes of value to both agents, effectively defining
the scope of attributes over which distributive negotiation takes place. (This is
discussed in further detail below.)
2. Acting as a conduit for communication. Full disclosure of an agent’s interests
puts it at a disadvantage in a negotiation. Instead, agents communicate their
interests and incremental offers/concessions to the mediator. The mediator com-
municates both the results of the integrative bargaining stage (see below), as
3Of course, for this case, it could be debated as to what extent the mediator had vested interests in specific
outcomes.
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well as indicating at the end of each round of the distributive phase whether an
agreement/deal has been reached.
3. Acting as a referee, imposing penalties for “dishonest” bidding practices. Agents
are self-interested in advertising “reserve” prices that make the available size of
the pie as small as possible, i.e., leaving as little scope for negotiation as possible
while still allowing the possibility of a deal. Prior to the start of the distributive
phase of the negotiation, participants advertise to the mediator “reserve” prices
on each attribute of value.4 When a deal is reached, the mediator distributes the
pie so as bias against participants that have been “dishonest” by making offers a
long way from their nominated reserve.
4.2 Integrative Bargaining
Multi-attribute negotiation [27] (also known as multi-issue negotiation) extends stan-
dard negotiation strategies by allowing participants to negotiate over multiple items
simultaneously, trading off concessions on different items which may have different
utitilities for different participants. This has important benefits: the space of outcomes
is broadened, increasing the possibility of reaching a deal that is satisfactory to all
parties. The Camp David negotiation (in 1978) between Egypt and Israel [27] is one
real-world example of a multi-attribute negotiation.5
Given the complexity of having to reach agreements on multiple issues, simultane-
ous negotiation over all issues may not be always tractable. For instance, in the pres-
ence of imcomplete information, non-cooperative bargaining theory cannot provide
any tractable solution to the problem of simultaneous (multi-attribute) negotiation. As
a consequence, game theorists mostly address the challenge by decomposing the prob-
lem into issue-by-issue negotiations. In addition to the problem of having to agree
on the negotiation agenda (on how to proceed with the issue-by-issue negotiation),
trading-off between different issues also becomes problematic. That is, all parties must
agree on one party’s concessions on an issue to allow this party to claim more shares on
future issues. For a survey on the literature on multi-attribute negotiations, the reader
is referred to [17].
Integrative bargaining is effectively the process by which the different attributes are
introduced to the negotiation. Standard approaches to mixed integrative- and distributive-
negotiation interleaves the two processes. However, this can prohibit reaching the op-
timally fair outcome for all parties: e.g., one agent may withold information regarding
which attributes are important to it for the purpose of obtaining a better deal for itself.
Separating integrative and distributive negotiation into distinct phases removes the
possibility of this sort of manipulation. Each party is required to reveal to the mediator
which attributes are of interest to it at the start of the process, along with its proposed
utility for each attribute. The mediator then defines the scope of the distributive bar-
gaining phase by deciding on the attributes over which negotiation will take place,
without disclosing the proposed value of these attributes to the other parties. In this
4Note that an agent may be dishonest about the reserve it advertises, but would then run the risk of the
mediator concluding that no deal was possible.
5Other examples can be found in the literature: e.g., [37][29][9].
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way, agents are unable to manipulate the scope of the negotiation, but neither are they
disadvantaged by having their utilities revealed to other parties.
In summary:
• the mediator decides the scope of the negotiation;
• the mediator does not have all information: agents may not have been honest
with respect to stated value of the items under negotiation;
• participants don’t know anything about each other’s interests and perceived val-
ues, other than what the mediator tells them the items of conflicting value are.
4.3 Distributive Bargaining
The distributive bargaining phase of the negotiation is the most usually studied in the
literature on automated negotiation. Standard approaches to automated negotiation
are based on game theoretic models under uncertain information. As discussed ear-
lier, in such approaches agents are considered to be self-interested and behave non-
cooperatively. Furthermore, in the presence of incomplete information, strategic sig-
nalling devices are introduced to facilitate agreements. The most common strategic
devices used within the bargaining literature and a large part of automated negotiation
literature are the use of time with discount factors, and the use of deadlines. For a spe-
cific information structure defined in a bargaining game, under some strict assumptions
over the rationality of the agents as well as their unbounded computational capabilities,
research within this branch mainly focuses on equilibrium analysis of the negotiation
game.
The important difference in our approach is the introduction of the mediator. The
distributive phase begins with agents nominating their reserve price on each of the
attributes under negotiation. While there is no way to guarantee or enforce that agents
are honest with respect to the reserve they disclose, an agent that nominates a dishonest
reserve (e.g., a buyer that discloses a reserve well below what she is really willing to
pay) is in danger of sabotaging the possibility of any deal at all—the mediator may
indicate that no deal is possible because there is no overlap between the nominated
reserves. Since agents are self-interested in striking a deal (for somewhere inside their
actual (unadvertised) reserve), then this would be a loss to that agent.
For our purposes here, we assume that in the case where there is no overlap between
the reserve prices, the mediator cancels the negotiation altogether. In reality, of course,
an agent may instigate a new negotiation process, nominating a reserve closer to her
actual reserve; in this case, the mediator would impose a (heavy) penalty for this clear
attempt to manipulate the process. However, for simplicity our current model only
considers the case in which there is overlap between the reserve prices.
Note that all reserve information is kept from being made public. In particular, the
reserves themselves are retained by the mediator but not disclosed to other agents. The
only uses of the reserve are (i) for the mediator to determine that a successful outcome
is possible, and (ii) to estimate a “fair” distribution of the pie.
Further, actual offers are also not disclosed publicly, so as to reduce the possibility
of manipulation. Rather than proposals and counter-proposals being presented directly
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to other participating agents, each agent presents its offer only to the mediator. Making
an offer is multi-attributive and simultaneous, in that all agents make offers at the same
time on all attributes under consideration. Recall that this may not include all attributes
in the space: the mediator will have already determined the attributes of “value” during
the integrative phase of the negotiation.
After each round of making an offer, the mediator announces whether or not a
deal has been reached and, if so, determines the distribution of the pie. Details of
each agent’s offers are not advertised, however, ensuring that agents are protected from
having such information manipulated by others.
If a deal has not been reached in a given round, then each agent submits a new offer,
which may involve a concession—i.e., an alteration of its previous offer that results in
a reduced potential gain (e.g., a buyer offering a higher price or a seller willing to
accept a lower price). Of course, an agent may have previously made an offer at its
reserve price and be unable to concede any further. If two consecutive turns involve no
concession by any party, then the mediator assumes that the possibility of a deal has
passed and the negotiation is terminated.6 We describe below a penalty scheme that
mitigates a potential attempt by an agent to manipulate this aspect of the protocol by
continuing to concede (and thereby preventing the negotiation from terminating early)
by offering very small concessions on its offers.
If the mediator ever receives offers that overlap, then the negotiation process is
successfully terminated. The pie is that amount between the two final offers—e.g.,
between the price the buyer is willing to pay and the price the seller is willing to ac-
cept. The mediator informs the participants of the successful outcome, and fixes a final
price that distributes the pie. The process for determining this price is discussed in the
following section.
4.4 Promoting Efficiency and Fairness
One role of the mediator is designed to protect agents from being exploited by not
publicly disclosing agents’ offers, and by making decisions, such as which attributes
are of value to all, without disclosing the associated values. The protocol described in
the previous two sections described the implementation of these.
At the end of a successful negotiation process—i.e., when offers from the agents
have overlapped—the mediator (who is the only participant that knows all agents’
offers)—decides on the distribution of the pie. This distribution is calculated so as to
bias against agents that have made offers far from their reserve: agents making offers
closer to their reserve receive a corresponding larger portion of the pie;
The mediator also enforces a penalty designed to promote efficiency and fairness,
and designed to prevent agents from manipulating the negotiation process. While each
agent has no direct information related to the value to which other agents hold the
attributes under negotiation, an agent could still try to win a highly advantageous deal
for itself by proposing offers which are a long way from its reserve, and by then making
extremely small incremental concessions on its offer position. For example, a buyer
6This situation is possible even if agents are not at their advertised reserve; e.g., if an agent concedes
transaction costs (see Section 4.4) so that its effective reserve is altered by that amount.
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may increase its offer on an item by the smallest amount possible at each round (e.g.,
making new offers on a house at one cent increments!).
We propose a penalty scheme to reduce the advantage of such behaviour:
• To disincentivise agents from making tiny incremental concessions, a transac-
tion penalty, or concession penalty, is imposed for each round in which an agent
concedes.
The transaction penalty is crucial not just for ensuring greater efficiency of the
negotiation process, but also to help ensure fairness. The pie-distribution protocol has
less effect if agents make only small concessions: if this were the case, then the size
of the pie would be correspondingly small and a “dishonest” agent would have little to
lose from the biased distribution of the pie. However, the transaction cost encourages
all agents to reach an agreement early, making it advantageous to increase their offers,
while ensuring less to lose if competing agents don’t do the same (due to the way the
pie is distributed).
Of course, if an agent starts by providing a highly dishonest reserve price (i.e., by
nominating a reserve that is not close to their actual reserve value) then the loss in the
pie-distribution can be minimised. Similarly, an agent may simply not concede (even
though it hasn’t reached its reserve price) and not incur a transaction cost. However, in
both these situations the agent would risk having the mediator terminate the negotiation
(either because there was no possible solution to start with, or if the other agent also
happened to not concede). Since our assumption is that it is in the agents’ interests to
reach a deal (otherwise they wouldn’t be participating in the negotiation to start with),
these are both risky strategies.
The degree to which fairness and efficiency are impacted by these penalty schemes
is dependent on the actual penalty values. This is discussed further below.
5 The Negotiation Process Using the Mediator
In this section, we set out to describe a negotiation procedure that allows the negotia-
tors to go through both phases of a negotiation, namely value creation and value claim-
ing. Essentially, a negotiation procedure characterises a plan of interaction between
the parties confronted with a negotiation problem. We make several assumptions to
make applicable several techniques from the Operations Research literature for search-
ing for joint gains. We assume that O ⊆ Rm: i.e., the attributes take values from the
set of real numbers R. We further assume that the set O is convex. We also formalise
the negotiating parties’ interests using the objective vector function, for each agent i,
~fi = [fij ] : O → Yi, (j = 1, . . . , qi), where qi is the number of objectives of agent
i, and Yi ⊆ Rqi limits the feasible ranges for the objective functions fij of agent i. A
utility function ui : Yi → Ui, where Ui ⊆ R, can be defined for each agent i. We also
assume that the functions ~fi and ui are concave.
REMARK: We are deviating here from the standard representation in which the
utility functions map from the set of outcomes to R. By using the objective functions,
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we are able to separate the agents’ interests from the attributes of the outcomes. At-
tributes are often, especially in auctions, considered equivalent to objectives. Note,
however, that negotiators may introduce and discuss spurious attributes in order to
achieve preferable outcomes on other attributes. In many negotiations interests are not
revealed and are defined over several attributes. As discussed thoroughly by Keeney
and Raiffa [12], it is quite likely that an agent’s multiple objectives will conflict with
each other in that the improved achievement with one objective can only be accom-
plished at the expense of another. For instance, most businesses and public services
have objectives such as “minimise cost” and “maximise the quality of services.” Since
better services can often only be attained for a price, these objectives conflict.
Example 1 We reconsider the example discussed in Section 3. In this example, we
have the following three attributes comprising the decision alternatives (i.e., outcomes)
in this negotiation: p for price, l for the length of warranty (assuming that the value
space for this attribute is the interval [0, 5] ⊂ R), and a for the amount paid by credit
card. Note that we have deliberately reformulated these attributes to allow them to take
values from the set of real numbers R. That is, instead of using a a discrete decision
variable to represent the payment method (cash vs. credit card), we have translated it
into a continuous variable a.
In this example, the seller S has two objectives: “minimise cost,” fS,c, and “max-
imise revenue,” fS,r. We define: fS,r = (p−a)+0.95×a, and fS,c = c+30×l, where
c is the seller’s cost of providing the laptop and $30 indicates the seller’s cost of pro-
viding a warranty for the laptop per year. On the other hand, the buyer B has also two
objectives: “minimise cost,” fB,c, and “optimise after-sale services,” fB,s. We define:
fB,c = p, and fB,s = 100 × l. Thus, the buyer actually values each year of warranty
at $100, and it is indifferent to him whether any amount would be paid by credit card.
Now, assume that uS(fS,c, fS,r) = fS,r−fS,c, and uB(fB,c, fB,s) = v+fB,s−fB,c,
where v is the buyer B’s valuation of the laptop’s worth when it comes with no war-
ranty. Consider the case of v = c. That is, the buyer’s valuation of the laptop is the
same as the seller’s cost to provide it. When l = 0 and a > 0, then no agreement can
be reached as it costs the seller more to provide the laptop than it is worth to the buyer.
However, when l = 5, a maximum gain from trade of $350 (provided that a = 0) can
be generated. That is, the buyer values the laptop with a 5-year warranty at (c+ $500)
while it only costs the seller (c+$150) to provide this deal. Thus, any price p between
(c+ $150) and (c+ $500) would give both players positive utilities.
We now discuss several mechanisms to help the negotiating parties reach such effi-
cient outcomes.
5.1 Information Structure of Negotiation
Research has shown that cooperation in general brings better pay-offs to all parties in
terms of mutual benefits or by attaining common goals and thus fully realising poten-
tial gains (see [1, 2, 10, 24, 33]). However, it is still the case that in real world situations
people do not always behave cooperatively, especially during negotiations, even when
the goal is to search for joint gains. This is evidenced by the negotiators’ frequent
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failure to achieve efficient agreements in practice [27, 34] and their unwillingness to
disclose private information due to strategic reasons. While further empirical and sys-
tematic studies need to be performed to explain this behaviour, it is also clear why
a party would behave non-cooperatively when she enjoys distinct unfair advantages
against her opponents. For instance, the advantageous party could have complete in-
formation about her opponents’ private information such as their objectives and utility
functions and all of their alternatives outside of the negotiation. If this is the case,
the informed party is unlikely to cooperate with the mediator, but would prefer to take
advantage of this additional information to either manipulate the outcome of the ne-
gotiation, or to claim the largest possible share of the pie to herself. If this happens
to be the information structure of the negotiation, a mediator is unlikely to be able to
play a constructive role in the negotiation since the advantageous agent will dictate the
negotiation process by forcing other parties to make all possible concessions.
Fortunately, such an asymmetric information structure is rather rare in most real-
world situations and in automated negotiation. Therefore, we assume in the remainder
of this paper that the information structure of the negotiation is symmetric, giving no
particular unfair advatage to any of the agents. Thus, all agents have the incentive to
cooperate with the mediator to extract all possible gains attainable from the negotiation.
5.2 Using the Mediator at the Integrative Phase
The integrative phase of the negotiation involves deciding which attributes of value
can be ignored during the distributive phase due to there being no conflict of value,
and which values need to be negotiated over. There are a number of different strate-
gies possible here: [36] discusses some of these strategies as well as providing formal
details.
In this phase, agents provide information about their utility functions and objectives
to the mediator, and information on some attributes as they deem appropriate. Using
this information, the mediator determines the attributes for which an optimal value can
be found, and those need to be resolved by further negotiation (i.e., at the distributive
phase). This determination is partly decided by the amount of information that the
agents choose to disclose.
For example, we refer to the laptop purchasing example above. The Seller and
Buyer agents disclose their respective utility functions uS and uB , along with their ob-
jective functions (i.e., “minimise cost” and “maximise revenue” for Seller; “minimise
cost” and “maximise after-sales service” for Buyer). The Seller also discloses infor-
mation about the cost of providing the warranty ($30 per year) and the cost incurred
by a credit card transaction (5% of price paid). The Buyer discloses information about
her valuation of the warranty ($100 per year) and indifference between paying cash or
credit card. However, they do not disclose c, the cost to the Seller of providing the
laptop, or v, the valuation by the Buyer of the laptop.
Given this information, the mediator is able to maximise the joint utilities for all
parties (i.e., uS + uB), while holding c and v constant (since it has no information
on c and v), by choosing values for the length of the warranty l to be 5 (the maximum
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allowed) and fixing the payment to be cash rather than credit card.7 Note that the actual
cost of providing the warranty is not fixed, but is incorporated into the negotiation over
the price of the laptop: i.e., the distributive phase becomes a negotiation over the price
of a laptop and 5-year-warranty bundle, with the payment being in cash.
Of course, the attributes and values that can be set by the mediator prior to the
distributive phase of the negotiation depend on the information that the agents choose
to disclose: if one of the agents had chosen not to disclose any information about the
warranty, say, then the mediator would not have been able to fix the length of warranty
at this stage, and this would have become part of the negotiation at the distributive
phase.
As we described earlier, the advantage of agents disclosing information about the
“non-core” attributes during the integrative phase is so that the distributive phase can
be simplified, and focussed on the specific attributes that matter (in our case, the price
of the laptop/warranty bundle). In the extreme cases such as those discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, agents do not disclose enough information for the mediator to set any of the
attributes, and the distributive phase degenerates into standard multi-attribute negotia-
tion [27]. See [36] for details on alternative approaches to how the integrative phase
may be managed.
At this point, the mediator and negotiating parties are almost ready to begin the
distributive phase of the negotiation. The final step is for each agent to disclose a
reserve to the mediator for each attribute that is the subject of the negotiation: in our
case, it is the price of the laptop/5-year-warranty bundle. Of course, an agent may
choose to disclose a dishonest reserve in order to try to obtain an advantage: e.g.,
the Seller may nominate a reserve that is higher than the price she is really willing to
accept; conversely, the Buyer may specify a reserve that is lower than the price she is
really willing to pay. Potental consequences for false disclosures are discussed below.
However, as long as there is a gap between these reserves (i.e., the Seller’s reserve is
lower than the Buyer’s reserve) then the mediator will open the distributive phase by
inviting opening offers.
5.3 Using the Mediator at the Distributive Phase
The previous section discussed the integrative process, whereby the mediator deter-
mined which attributes were in conflict and which attributes could be fixed and solved
independently. For example, fixing a 5-year warranty and cash-payment was deemed
by the mediator to be a good outcome for both parties.
The conflicting attribute—in this case, (cash) price p of the laptop plus warranty—
is the attribute on which the Seller and Buyer make proposals. In general, there may
still be multiple attributes to negotiate over at the distributive phase; for simplicity we
illustrate the process with a single attribute.
5.3.1 Reserve Disclosure.
As part of the integrative phase, the two parties released information to the mediator
relating to their reserve price. Let the Seller’s disclosed reserve price for the laptop-
7Further details on the optimisation process can be found in [36].
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plus-warranty bundle be pS , where pS is likely to be greater than c + 150 (where c is
the cost of the laptop to the Seller and $150 is the cost of offering the 5-year plan).8
Similarly, we denote the Buyer’s disclosed reserve price for the bundle as pB , where
pB is likely to be below v + 500 (where v is the Buyer’s valuation of the laptop and
$500 is her valuation of the 5-year warranty).
Of course, either or both agent may have been dishonest in the reserves they dis-
closed to the mediator: the Seller’s actual reserve for the bundle is paS ≤ pS , while the
Buyer’s actual reserve is pB ≤ paB . Under an ideal honest disclosure a deal would be
possible so long as it is the case that paS ≤ paB . However, the mediator will call off the
negotiation unless pS ≤ pB , which is potentially a more narrow condition. This is the
risk with disclosing a dishonest reserve price to the mediator: the mediator may call
off the negotiation, to the detrimnent of both agents, in a situation where a deal may
actually have been possible. For example, suppose the Seller would potentially accept
any price above $2600, covering costs of laptop and warranty and providing a (mini-
mal) profit, while the Buyer is willing to pay up to $2900 for laptop plus warranty. In
this case a deal is clearly possible. However, if the Seller informs the mediator that she
requires a price of $3000 at minimum, then the mediator terminates the negotiation and
the opportunity of a deal is missed. Similarly, if the Seller tells the mediator she insists
on $2750 and the Buyer also informs the mediator of a maximum price of $2700, then
once again the mediator terminates the process.
5.3.2 Making Offers and Concessions.
Unlike in standard distributive negotiation, each agent’s offer is not publicly announced
but only disclosed to the mediator. At each step, the mediator annouces whether agree-
ment has been reached; if not, new offers are invited, with each agent choosing either
to re-offer the same amount or choosing to make a concession (i.e. make an offer that
is closer to its reserve).
If an agent chooses not to make a concession, then it runs the risk of having the
negotiation terminated. That is, after a round in which no agreement has been reached
and no concessions have been made by any of the agents, the mediator announces
that a possible deadlock could be reached and invites the negotiating parties to make
concessions to avoid the negotiation from being called off. The mediator then calls a
halt if no party makes any further concession in the subsequent round.
On the other hand, making a concession involves paying a penalty, as described
above. This effectively lowers the value of the pie for the penalised party. Equivalently,
the mediator can view this as the reserve effectively being adjusted (higher for a Seller,
lower for a Buyer) by the amount of the penalty.9 For example, consider again our
example involving the laptop and warranty, whereby the Seller nominates a reserve
price of $2600 and the Buyer a reserve of $2900, and suppose the policy in place
charges $10 for each concession. After a concession from each side, the mediator will
believe that the Buyer would now only be willing to pay up to $2890, and that the Seller
8Of course, in some situations sellers may actually drop selling price below cost.
9Of course, an agent may have disclosed a dishonest reserve, but for the purposes of deciding when
agreement is no longer possible it amounts to the same thing.
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would require at least $2610 to cover costs and to protect profit margin. If each party
has conceded, say, 10 times, then the penalties imposed leaves little margin for trading.
In general, suppose the Seller nominates a reserve pS and has offered a concession
on n occasions, and suppose the Buyer has nominated a reserve of pB and offered m
concessions. If the penalty for each concession is c then the mediator only believes a
deal is possible while pS + n.c ≤ pS −m.c. Again, the mediator’s information about
actual reserve may be incorrect, but this is the information the mediator acts on.
The precise value of the concession penalty is varied across markets, and may
potentially be fixed by the mediator at the start of the distributive negotiating phase.
Clearly, the higher the value of this penalty, the greater the incentive to reach agree-
ment quickly, and the higher the disincentive for agents to attempt to win a larger share
of the pie by small incremental concessions. In our scenario, a concession penalty of
$100 would highly motivate both agents to open with an offer close to their reserve!
(Opening offers incur no penalty, of course.)
If one agent does offer close to the reserve and the other “bluffs” in the hope of
winning the larger share of the pie, then the first agent may also be forced not to con-
cede further while the other agent will be forced to do so and incur the penalty. For
example, supposing the exhorbitant penalty of $100, if the Buyer offered $2850 (close
to its reserve of $2900) while the Seller offered $2900, then the Buyer would be forced
not to change its offer (or incur a penalty that took it past its stated reserve) while the
Seller would expect to concede (and thereby incur the penalty). If the Seller next of-
fered, say, $2800, the mediator would indicate that an agreement had been reached and
proceed with distributing the pie of value $50 (the difference between the final offers).
The Seller would not only receive $100 less than the final price determined by the
mediator, but would also be disadvantaged in the pie-distribution since it made offers
further away from its stated reserve: this issue is discussed below.
It should be noted that, in general, there is the potential for a variant of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma here: one agent may take the risk of incurring the concession penalty
and “bluff”, in the expectation that the other will make an opening offer close to its
offer, whereas a joint-optimal strategy is for both agents to make “fair” offers and not
concede any penalty. Setting a higher penalty lowers the potential success of such a
strategy; however, setting the penalty too high may result in too much value being
drawn from the negotiation. We are currently performing experiments to determine
optimal penalty-setting strategies for different negotiation scenarios.
5.3.3 Distributing the Pie.
Since the agents’ offers are not publicised to each other, an agreement may be reached
with significant overlap between the respective offers. This overlap, or pie, needs to be
distributed. The distribution process is designed to promote fairness by biasing towards
agents that have been making offers more “honestly”, in the sense of being closer to
their nominated reserve. This could be done in a number of ways. Here, we assume
that the mediator simply distributes the pie by proportioning the overlap between final
offers according to how far each is from the corresponding agent’s nominated reserve
price. A possible alternative is to take agents’ history of offers over the negotiation into
account.
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Following on with our example, suppose that the mediator detects a deal when the
Buyer offers $2850, with the Seller having conceded to $2800, leaving a pie of $50.
This leaves the Buyer $50 from its nominated reserve of $2900 and the Seller $200
from its reserve of $2600. The mediator therefore sets the final price at $2810, i.e., so
that 20% of the pie is allocated to the Seller and 80% to the Buyer.10
While this strategy can minimize advantages gained by aggressive and/or dishonest
negotiation strategies, it can never remove them of course, since the final price will
always be further from its reserve than an agent’s final offer. However, this is only
reasonable: an agent that negotiates successfully reaps the rewards of that success; but
some of the advantages of a “dishonest” strategy of making offers a long distance from
its reserve are dampened.
An important final point is that the protocol for distributing the pie does not take
any concession penalties into account: i.e., the reserve prices as originally advertised
by the agents to the mediator are used for calculating proportional distribution. Since
agents are aware of all concession penalties they have incurred, we can assume that
the final price set by the mediator will always be one that the agent is prepared to
accept. In particular, assuming the Seller of our example conceded once, then her final
remuneration for the laptop and warranty is $2710, i.e., the mediator-set final price
of $2810 minus the concession penalty of $100. Assuming the Buyer did not concede,
then she pays the set price of $2810, and the penalty of $100 is paid to the marketplace.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have described a framework which recognises that negotiation has
a greater chance of success if two different approaches to negotiation are combined.
The traditional distributive approach of trying to reach agreement while coming from
opposite directions, is complemented by an integrative approach which tries to discover
all possible aspects of the situation which could be helpful in reaching an agreement.
The integrative approach is well developed and accepted by conflict theorists and
management scientists. We have attempted to take some of these ideas and incorporate
them into a computational approach suitable for automated negotiation. A number of
the key points suggested in the seminal work of Fisher and Ury [6] have been incor-
porated into our framework. The importance of focussing on interests, not positions
is addressed in our framework by having an initial phase where agents openly reveal
their interests to the mediator. Employing a mediator avoids the potentially negative
effects of disclosing information to the person you are negotiating with. The key point
of looking at options for mutual gain is achieved by having the mediator attempt to
find optimal mutual gain solutions for as many atrributes as possible of those disclosed
by the agents, prior to entering the distributive phase of the negotiation. Fisher and
Ury also suggest that objective criteria should be used where possible. While we have
not explicitly discussed this in our framework, it would certainly be possible for the
mediator to incorporate information regarding objective criteria within a particular do-
main, into the final stage of determining how the available pie should be distributed,
10I.e., $50:$200 is 20:80.
19
once an agreement is reached. In fact knowledge of objective criteria could be used by
the mediator to continue pushing the agents for concessions, even after an agreement
was possible, in the interest of reaching an agreement that was fairer according to some
objective criteria.
The final important point made by Fisher and Ury, regarding the importance of the
agents being clear about their Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA,
has to do with the individual agents’ utility function, and is therefore not covered in
this paper. However, if agents do have a clear and well defined BATNA, and reveal
this to the mediator in the initial phase, then our framework makes it possible for the
mediator to determine immediately that a negotiated agreement is actually not in the
interests of the negotiating parties.
While the framework that we have described does attempt to control manipulation
using small concessions, as well as rewarding agents that propose solutions closer to
their real reserve, there is still room for manipulation. Unlike some of the game theo-
retic distributive approaches, we have not defined a strategy which ensures that an agent
is unable to realise gains by playing a manipulative strategy. However, we believe that
across many transactions, the framework we have proposed does favour agents using
open and non-manipulative strategies.
We have implemented the framework and are in the process of designing experi-
ments to explore this issue, focussing on agents in different kinds of environments with
regard to the characteristics of the other agents. It may well be that a manipulative
agent operating in a world where all other agents are open and non-manipulative does
realise an advantage, but once the environment is more heterogeneous this advantage
may disappear, and in fact become a disadvantage in terms of numbers of successfully
concluded negotiations, as well as profits. As we gain greater understanding of the
nuances of the two phases, the basic framework can possibly be adjusted slightly to
be more robust with respect to potential manipulation. However we believe the basic
framework we have provided will prove to be both powerful and robust. It combines
integrative and distributive negotiation in a well defined manner, managing at least to
a large extent the anomaly that good integrative process requires openness and hon-
esty, whereas in the competitive distributive process agents can be in a more powerful
position if they do not disclose everything.
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